


Forecasting with Poor Data and Models: An Info-Gap Approach

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1 *Highlights*

1.1 *Severe Uncertainties: Info-Gaps*

- **Models:**
 - Conflicting.
 - Simplistic.
 - Incomplete.
- **Data:**
 - Random.
 - Biased, unknown correlations.
 - Subject to revision.
- **Time:**
 - Past may not reflect future.
 - Laws may change.

§ The art of designing, deciding, planning:
Use the **wrong model** and **data**
to make the **right decision**
(when the right model is unknown).

§ Info-gap decision strategies:

- Robust-satisficing:
protect against uncertainty.
- Opportune-windfalling:
exploit uncertainty.

1.2 Shackle-Popper Indeterminism

§ Intelligence:

What people know,
influences how they behave.

§ Discovery:

What will be discovered tomorrow
cannot be known today.

§ Indeterminism:

Tomorrow's behavior cannot be
modelled completely today.

§ **Information-gaps, indeterminisms,
sometimes
cannot be modelled probabilistically.**

§ **Ignorance is not probabilistic.**

2 INFO-GAP FORECASTING

Yakov Ben-Haim, 2009,
Info-gap forecasting,
European Journal of Operational Research.

Yakov Ben-Haim, 2010,
Info-Gap Economics:
An Operational Introduction,
Palgrave-Macmillan.

2.1 1-D Example

§ “True” scalar system:

$$y_t = \lambda_t y_{t-1}$$

§ **Historical data:** $\lambda_t = \tilde{\lambda}$ for $t \leq T$.

§ Contextual understanding:

λ could drift upwards.

§ Fractional-error info-gap model:

$$\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{\lambda}) = \left\{ \lambda_t, t > T : 0 \leq \frac{\lambda_t - \tilde{\lambda}}{\tilde{\lambda}} \leq h \right\}, \quad h \geq 0$$

- Unbounded family of sets.
- No worst case.

§ Slope-adjusted (erroneous) forecaster:

$$y_t^s = \ell y_{t-1}^s$$

§ Contrast with historically estimated model:

$$y_t = \tilde{\lambda}_t y_{t-1}$$

How to choose $\ell \geq \tilde{\lambda}$?

§ Robust satisficing:

Satisfice the forecast error:

$$|y_{T+k}^s - y_{T+k}| \leq \varepsilon_c$$

Maximize robustness to future surprise.


§ Robustness of forecast ℓ :

Max h up to which all λ_{T+i} in $\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{\lambda})$

satisfice forecast error at ε_c :

$$\widehat{h}_s(\ell, \varepsilon_c) = \max \left\{ h : \left(\max_{\substack{\lambda_{T+i} \in \mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{\lambda}) \\ i=1, \dots, k}} |y_{T+k}^s - y_{T+k}| \right) \leq \varepsilon_c \right\}$$

§ Preference: $\ell \succ \ell'$ if $\widehat{h}_s(\ell, \varepsilon_c) > \widehat{h}_s(\ell', \varepsilon_c)$



§ Trade off: robustness vs. forecast error.

§ Zeroing: Estim outcome has 0 robustness.

§ Crossing robustness curves: $\ell \succ \tilde{\lambda}$.

- Preference reversal.
- Robustness-advantage of
sub-optimal (erroneous) model.

§ Robustness is proxy for success-probability.

§ Numerical example.




Figure 1: Robustness vs. normalized forecast error for $\ell = 1.05, 1.1, 1.15, 1.2$ from bottom to top curve. $\tilde{\lambda} = 1.05$, $y_T = 1$. $k = 1$ (left), 2(mid), 3(right).

- Preference reversal at all time horizons, k .
- Robustness premium decreases with k .
- Reversal- ε_c increases with k .

Robustness & Probability of Forecast Success

§ **Future growth coefficients:** $\lambda_{T,k} = (\lambda_{T+1}, \dots, \lambda_{T+k})$.

$\lambda_{T,k}$ is random vector on domain D .

$F(\lambda_{T,k})$ = cumulative probability distrib.

§ **Forecast success set:**

$$\mathcal{Y}(\ell) = \{\lambda_{T,k} \in D : |y_{T+k}^s(\ell) - y_{T+k}| \leq \varepsilon_c\}$$

§ **Probability of success:**

$$P_s(\ell) = F[\mathcal{Y}(\ell)]$$

§ Goal:

Choose ℓ to maximize success prob.

§ Problem:

$F(\lambda_{T,k}) = \text{is unknown.}$

§ Solution:

- $\widehat{h}_s(\ell, \varepsilon_c)$ is known.
- $\widehat{h}_s(\ell, \varepsilon_c)$ proxies for success prob.

§ Theorem.

Probability of successful forecast, $P_s(\ell)$, increases with

increasing info-gap robustness, $\hat{h}_s(\ell, \varepsilon_c)$.

Given: (a) The domain of $F(\cdot)$ is contained in the info-gap model of eq.(2.1). (b) $y_T > 0$, $\tilde{\lambda} > 0$. (c) ℓ and ℓ' are two slope parameters for which:

$$\hat{h}_s(\ell, \varepsilon_c) > \hat{h}_s(\ell', \varepsilon_c) > 0$$

Then:

$$P_s(\ell) \geq P_s(\ell')$$

§ Robustness is proxy for success-probability.

Summary so far:

§ **Forecasters** do better if they robust-satisfice.

§ **Satisficing is not a last resort.**

It is strategically advantageous.

2.2 European Central Bank: Overnight Rate

Date	Interest rate	Implied λ
1 Jan 1999	4.50	
9 Apr 1999	3.50	0.778
5 Nov 1999	4.00	1.143
4 Feb 2000	4.25	1.063
17 Mar 2000	4.50	1.059
28 Apr 2000	4.75	1.056
9 Jun 2000	5.25	1.105
28 Jun 2000	5.25	1.000
1 Sep 2000	5.50	1.048
6 Oct 2000	5.75	1.045
11 May 2001	5.50	0.957
31 Aug 2001	5.25	0.955

§ Typical change: 25 basis points.

§ Largest change: 100 basis points.

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§ 9Jun'00–31Aug'01: $\mu = 5.4\%$, $\sigma = 0.19\%$.

§ On 9/12/2001, (1 day after 9/11)

predict next interest rate.

Rate down, but by how much?


§ Historical model:

$$y_t = \lambda_t y_{t-1}, \quad \lambda_t = \tilde{\lambda} = 1$$

§ Info-gap model:

$$\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{\lambda}) = \left\{ \lambda_T : (1-h)\tilde{\lambda} \leq \lambda_T \leq \tilde{\lambda} \right\}, \quad h \geq 0$$

§ Robustness:






Figure 2: Robustness vs normalized forecast error. $\tilde{\lambda} = 1$, $y_T = 5.25$.

§ $\ell = 1.0 \implies 0\% \text{ robustness at } 0\% \text{ error.}$

§ $\ell = 0.95 \implies 10\% \text{ robustness at } 5\% \text{ error.}$

§ $\ell = 0.9 \implies 20\% \text{ robustness at } 10\% \text{ error.}$




Figure 3: Robustness vs normalized forecast error. $\tilde{\lambda} = 1$, $y_T = 5.25$.

§ $\ell = 0.9 \implies 20\% \text{ robustness at } 10\% \text{ error.}$

§ **Forecast:** $y_{T+1}^s = 0.9y_T = 4.725.$




Figure 4: Robustness vs normalized forecast error. $\tilde{\lambda} = 1$, $y_T = 5.25$.

§ $\ell = 0.9 \implies 20\% \text{ robustness at } 10\% \text{ error.}$


§ **Forecast:** $y_{T+1}^s = 0.9y_T = 4.725$.

§ **Outcome:**

- $y_{T+1} = 4.75$ on 18.9.2001.
- -0.5% forecast error.

2.3 Crossing Robustness Curves: General Case

§ Recall numerical example:



§ Crossing robustness curves:

Advantage of sub-optimal model.

§ How general?

§ System:

$$y_t = A_t y_{t-1}, \quad y_t \in \Re^N$$

§ Incorporate inputs into state vector.

§ Ignore zero-mean, additive, random disturbances.

§ Goal:

Given y_T and historical \tilde{A} ,
predict y_{T+k} within $\pm \varepsilon_c$.

§ Problem: Uncertain future A_t .

§ Info-gap model, $\mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A})$, $h \geq 0$.

Axioms:

Nesting: $h < h'$ implies $\mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A}) \subset \mathcal{U}(h', \bar{A})$

Contraction: $\mathcal{U}(0, \bar{A}) = \{\bar{A}\}$

§ Two levels of uncertainty:

- Horizon of uncertainty, h , unknown.
- Realization unknown.

§ Example: Unbounded-interval info-gap model:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A}) = \{ A_t, t > T : \\ \bar{A}_{ij} - hv_{ij} \leq [A_t]_{ij} \leq \bar{A}_{ij} + hw_{ij}, \\ i, j = 1, \dots, N \}, \quad h \geq 0\end{aligned}$$

§ Historically estimated model:

$$y_t = \tilde{A}y_{t-1}$$

§ Slope-adjusted predictor:

$$y_t^s = By_{t-1}^s$$

B chosen by forecaster.

§ Forecast error:

$$\eta_k(B, A_t) = y_{T+k}^s - y_{T+k} = \left(B^k - \prod_{i=1}^k A_{T+i} \right) y_T$$

§ Satisficing forecast requirement:

$$|\eta_{k,m}(B, A_t)| \leq \varepsilon_c$$

§ Robustness: Max tolerable uncertainty.

$$\widehat{h}(B, \varepsilon_c) = \max \left\{ h : \left(\max_{\substack{A_{T+i} \in \mathcal{U}(h, \widetilde{A}) \\ i=1, \dots, k}} |\eta_{k,m}(B, A_t)| \right) \leq \varepsilon_c \right\}$$

§ k-Step transition matrices:

$$\mathcal{U}_k(h, \bar{A}^k) = \left\{ A = \prod_{i=1}^k A_i : A_i \in \mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A}) \right\}, \quad h \geq 0$$

Lemma 1 *If $\mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A})$ is an info-gap model.
Then $\mathcal{U}_k(h, \bar{A}^k)$ is an info-gap model.*

§ 1-step thm based on
nesting and contraction axioms
is k-step thm.

§ Robustness-premium theorem. Define:

$$\theta_c(h) = \max_{A_{T+1} \in \mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A})} \sum_{n=1}^N [A_{T+1} - \bar{A}]_{mn} y_{T,n}$$

$$\theta_a(h) = - \min_{A_{T+1} \in \mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A})} \sum_{n=1}^N [A_{T+1} - \bar{A}]_{mn} y_{T,n}$$

- **Contraction:** $\theta_a(0) = \theta_c(0) = 0$.
- **Nesting:** $\theta_a(h)$ and $\theta_c(h)$ increase with h .
- $\theta_c(h)$ large: **IGM coherent** with y_T .
- $\theta_a(h)$ large: **IGM anti-coherent** with y_T .

Theorem 1 *Sub-optimal models are more robust than optimal models.*

Given:

- $y_T \neq 0$.
- $\mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A})$ is an info-gap model.
- $\theta_c(h)$ and $\theta_a(h)$ are continuous, at least one is unbounded, and either $\theta_c(h) \geq \theta_a(h)$ or $\theta_a(h) \geq \theta_c(h)$ for all $h > 0$.

Then: for any $\varepsilon_c > 0$ for which $\delta_x(\varepsilon_c) \neq 0$, there is a B such that:

$$\widehat{h}(B, \varepsilon_c) > \widehat{h}(\bar{A}, \varepsilon_c)$$

§ Evaluating the robustness. Define:

$$\theta_c(h) = \max_{A_{T+1} \in \mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A})} \sum_{n=1}^N [A_{T+1} - \bar{A}]_{mn} y_{T,n}$$


$$\theta_a(h) = - \min_{A_{T+1} \in \mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A})} \sum_{n=1}^N [A_{T+1} - \bar{A}]_{mn} y_{T,n}$$

$$\delta = \sum_{n=1}^N [B - \bar{A}]_{mn} y_{T,n}$$

- **Contraction:** $\theta_a(0) = \theta_c(0) = 0$.
- **Nesting:** $\theta_a(h)$ and $\theta_c(h)$ increase with h .
- $\theta_c(h)$ large: **IGM coherent** with y_T .
- $\theta_a(h)$ large: **IGM anti-coherent** with y_T .
- δ controlled by forecaster.

§ Robustness function:

$$\widehat{h}(B, \varepsilon_c) = \max \{ h : \delta + \theta_a(h) \leq \varepsilon_c \text{ and } -\delta + \theta_c(h) \leq \varepsilon_c \}$$



§ When is the robustness zero?

§ Anticipated 1-step prediction error:


$$\eta_{1,m}(B, \bar{A}) = \underbrace{\sum_{n=1}^N (B - \bar{A})_{mn} y_{T,n}}_{\delta}$$

§ When is the robustness zero?

§ Anticipated 1-step prediction error:

$$\eta_{1,m}(B, \bar{A}) = \underbrace{\sum_{n=1}^N (B - \bar{A})_{mn} y_{T,n}}_{\delta}$$

$\varepsilon_c = \delta$ has zero robustness:



§ Positive robustness only at greater-than-predicted forecast error.


§ Choose $B = \bar{A}$ to minimize

anticipated prediction error, $\eta_{1,m}(B, \bar{A})$???

§ Choose $B = \bar{A}$ to minimize

anticipated prediction error, $\eta_{1,m}(B, \bar{A})$???

- Predicted error is $\delta = 0$.
- $\varepsilon_c = \delta$ still has **zero robustness**:



§ Positive robustness only at

greater-than-predicted forecast error.

2.4 Robustness and Probability of Forecast Success

§ Probability of Forecast Success.

- Forecast success: $|\eta_{1,m}| \leq \varepsilon_c$, or:

$$\delta - \varepsilon_c \leq \underbrace{\sum_{n=1}^N [A_{T+1} - \bar{A}]_{mn} y_{T,n}}_u \leq \delta + \varepsilon_c$$

u = random variable.

$F(u)$ = cdf (unknown).

$\delta(B)$ = anticip. forecast error (chosen).

- Probability of forecast success:

$$P_s(B) = F(\delta + \varepsilon_c) - F(\delta - \varepsilon_c)$$

Thus:

$$\frac{dP_s(B)}{d\delta} > 0 \quad \text{if and only if} \quad f(\delta + \varepsilon_c) > f(\delta - \varepsilon_c)$$

§ $\theta_c(h) > \theta_a(h)$ implies:

- $[A_{T+1} - \bar{A}]_{mn}$ coherent with $\text{sgn}(y_{T,n})$.
- u tends to be positive. $u = \sum_{n=1}^N [A_{T+1} - \bar{A}]_{mn} y_{T,n}$
- $f(u)$ tends to increase around $u = 0$.

Definition 1 $\mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A})$ and $F(u)$ **coherent at** (δ, ε_c) **if:**

$$[\theta_c(h) - \theta_a(h)] [f(\delta + \varepsilon_c) - f(\delta - \varepsilon_c)] \geq 0 \text{ for all } h > 0$$

- **Coherence:**

The info-gap model

weakly reveals the pdf.

Theorem 2 *Robustness is a proxy for probability of forecast success. Given:*

- $y_T \neq 0$, $\varepsilon_c \geq 0$, $\delta_x(\varepsilon_c) \neq 0$, $|\delta| < |\delta_x(\varepsilon_c)|$.
- $\widehat{h}(B, \varepsilon_c) > 0$.
- $\theta_a(h)$ and $\theta_c(h)$ are continuous and at least one is unbounded.
- $\mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A})$ and $F(u)$ are coherent.

Then:

$$\frac{d\widehat{h}(B, \varepsilon_c)}{d\delta} > 0 \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \frac{dP_s(B)}{d\delta} > 0$$

§ Importance of proxy thm:

- $P_s(B)$ **unknown**.
- $\widehat{h}(B, \varepsilon_c)$ **known**.
- B chosen by forecaster.

§ Coherence of $\mathcal{U}(h, \bar{A})$ and $F(u)$ implies:

P_s is **not known** but **can be optimized**.

§ Many proxy theorems.

- $A = \text{model, data}$: **uncertain**.
- $\mathcal{U}(h, \widetilde{A}) = \text{info-gap model for uncertainty}$.
- $B = \text{design, decision, strategy}$.
- $\eta(B, A) = \text{outcome}$: $\eta(B, A) \leq \varepsilon_c$.
- $\widehat{h}(B, \varepsilon_c) = \text{robustness function}$.
- $P_s(B) = \text{probability of success}$.
- **Proxy “theorem”:**

$$\left(\frac{\partial \widehat{h}(B, \varepsilon_c)}{\partial B} \right) \left(\frac{\partial P_s(B)}{\partial B} \right) \geq 0$$

- **Fine print**: e.g. $\mathcal{U}(h, \widetilde{A})$ & $F(A)$ coherent.

§ Coherence: Example.

• **System:** $x_t = \lambda_t x_{t-1}$. **Historically:** $\lambda_t = \tilde{\lambda}$.

• **Future:** $\lambda_t = \tilde{\lambda} + u_t$, $f(u_t) = \begin{cases} 0, & u_t < \lambda_\star \\ \text{unknown}, & u_t \geq \lambda_\star \end{cases}$.

E.g. $f(u_t) = \begin{cases} 0, & u_t < \lambda_\star \\ \lambda_\star/u^2, & u_t \geq \lambda_\star \end{cases}$.

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- E.g. $f(u_t) = \begin{cases} 0, & u_t < \lambda_\star \\ \lambda_\star/u^2, & u_t \geq \lambda_\star \end{cases}$.
- **Forecaster:** $x_t^s = \ell x_{t-1}^s$.
- $\delta = \text{anticipated forecast error} = (\ell - \tilde{\lambda})y_T$.

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- **System:** $x_t = \lambda_t x_{t-1}$. **Historically:** $\lambda_t = \tilde{\lambda}$.
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- **Forecaster:** $x_t^s = \ell x_{t-1}^s$.
- $\delta = \text{anticipated forecast error} = (\ell - \tilde{\lambda})y_T$.
- $\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{\lambda}) = \{\lambda : \tilde{\lambda} \leq \lambda \leq (1+h)\tilde{\lambda}\}$, $h \geq 0$.
- $\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{\lambda})$ and $F(u)$ **coherent** if:

$$\tilde{\lambda} + \lambda_* - \frac{\varepsilon_c}{y_T} < \ell < \tilde{\lambda} + \lambda_* + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{y_T}.$$

§ Coherence: Example.

- **System:** $x_t = \lambda_t x_{t-1}$. **Historically:** $\lambda_t = \tilde{\lambda}$.
- **Future:** $\lambda_t = \tilde{\lambda} + u_t$, $f(u_t) = \begin{cases} 0, & u_t < \lambda_* \\ \text{unknown}, & u_t \geq \lambda_* \end{cases}$.
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- $\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{\lambda}) = \{\lambda : \tilde{\lambda} \leq \lambda \leq (1+h)\tilde{\lambda}\}$, $h \geq 0$.
- $\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{\lambda})$ and $F(u)$ **coherent** if:

$$\tilde{\lambda} + \lambda_* - \frac{\varepsilon_c}{y_T} < \ell < \tilde{\lambda} + \lambda_* + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{y_T}.$$
- **Then:** $\frac{\partial P_s}{\partial \ell} > 0$.
- $P_s(\ell)$ **unknown** but **improvable**.

2.5 Regression Prediction

Yakov Ben-Haim,

Info-Gap Economics:

An Operational Introduction,

2010, Palgrave-Macmillan, section 6.1.




Figure 5: US inflation vs. year, 1961–1965.

§ US inflation '61–'65: Linear?




Figure 6: US inflation vs. year, 1961–1965.




Figure 7: US inflation vs. year, 1961–1966.

§ US inflation '61–'65: Linear?

§ US inflation '61–'66: Quadratic?




Figure 8: US inflation vs. year, 1961–1965.




Figure 9: US inflation vs. year, 1961–1966.




Figure 10: US inflation vs. year, 1961–1970.

§ US inflation '61–'65: Linear?

§ US inflation '61–'66: Quadratic?

§ US inflation '61–'70: Piece-wise linear?




Figure 11: US inflation vs. year, 1961–1993.

§ US inflation '61–'93: A mess?




Figure 12: US inflation vs. year, 1961–1965.

§ US inflation '61–'65:

- Linear? Quadratic?
- Model '61–'65 for predicting '66:

$$y_i^r = c_0 + c_1 t_i + c_2 t_i^2$$

§ System model: MSE.

$$S_N^2(c) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (y_i - y_i^r)^2$$

$N = 5$ for '61-'65.

§ If we knew y_{N+1} ('66):

$$\begin{aligned} S_{N+1}^2(c) &= \frac{1}{N+1} \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} (y_i - y_i^r)^2 \\ &= \frac{N}{N+1} S_N^2(c) + \frac{(y_{N+1} - y_{N+1}^r)^2}{N+1} \end{aligned}$$

§ If we knew y_{N+1} ('66):

$$\begin{aligned} S_{N+1}^2(c) &= \frac{1}{N+1} \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} (y_i - y_i^r)^2 \\ &= \frac{N}{N+1} S_N^2(c) + \frac{(y_{N+1} - y_{N+1}^r)^2}{N+1} \end{aligned}$$

§ All we know is contextual info:

y_{N+1} may well exceed prediction, \bar{y}_{N+1}^r .

§ If we knew y_{N+1} ('66):

$$\begin{aligned} S_{N+1}^2(c) &= \frac{1}{N+1} \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} (y_i - y_i^r)^2 \\ &= \frac{N}{N+1} S_N^2(c) + \frac{(y_{N+1} - y_{N+1}^r)^2}{N+1} \end{aligned}$$

§ All we know is soft info:

y_{N+1} may well exceed prediction, \bar{y}_{N+1}^r .

§ Info-gap model of uncertain y_{N+1} :

$$\mathcal{U}(h) = \{y_{N+1} : 0 \leq y_{N+1} - \bar{y}_{N+1}^r \leq h\}, \quad h \geq 0$$

- Unbounded family of nested sets.
- No worst case.

§ Performance requirement:

$$S_{N+1}(c) \leq S_c$$

§ Performance requirement:

$$S_{N+1}(c) \leq S_c$$

§ Robustness of regression c :

Greatest tolerable uncertainty.

$$\hat{h}(c, S_c) = \max \left\{ h : \left(\max_{y_{N+1} \in \mathcal{U}(h)} S_{N+1}(c) \right) \leq S_c \right\}$$




Figure 13: US inflation vs. year, 1961–1965, and least squares fit.




Figure 14: Robustness vs. critical root mean squared error for inflation 1961–1965.

§ Least squares fit: fig. 13.

§ Robust of LS fit: fig. 14.

§ Trade off: Greater rbs. \equiv greater MSE.

§ Zeroing: No robustness of est. MSE.




Figure 15: US inflation vs. year, 1961–1965, and least squares fit (solid) and other fit (dash).




Figure 16: Robustness vs. critical root mean squared error for inflation 1961–1965 for least squares fit (solid) and other fit (dash).

§ Least squares and other fit: fig. 15.

§ Robust of LS and other fit: fig. 16.

Curve-crossing: preference reversal.

3 SUMMARY

§ Models:

**Attributes of model correspond to
attributes of reality.**

§ Model-based decision:

Adapt decision to attributes of model.

§ Optimization:

**Use best model to
choose decision with best outcome.**

§ Uncertainty:

- **Randomness:** structured uncertainty.
- **Info-gaps:** surprises, ignorance.

§ Fallacy of optimal model-based decision:

- Severe uncertainty:
 - Best model errs seriously.
 - Some model attributes are correct.
 - Some model attributes err greatly.
- Best-model optimization
 - exploits all model attributes to extreme.
 - Vulnerable to model error.

§ Resolution: Info-gap decision theory.

- Satisfice performance.
- Optimize robustness to uncertainty.
- Model and manage surprises.

§ Robust-satisficing syllogism:

- Adequate performance is necessary.
- More reliable adequate performance is better than less reliable adeq. perf.
- Thus maximum reliability is best.

§ Proxy theorems:

$\max \text{ robustness} \equiv \max \text{ survival prob.}$

§ Sources: <http://info-gap.com>

§ Applications of info-gap theory:

- Biological conservation.
- Public policy and regulation.
- Climate change.
- Sampling, assay design.
- Medical decision making.
- Engineering design.
- Fault detection and diagnosis.
- Project management.
- Homeland security.
- Statistical hypothesis testing.
- Monetary economics.
- Financial stability.